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Abstract 
 
Our research aims to analyze the possible existence of Granger-causal relationships in the behavior 
of public debt issued by peripheral member countries of the European Economic and Monetary 
Union (EMU), with special emphasis on the recent episodes of crisis triggered in the eurozone 
sovereign debt markets since 2009. With this goal in mind, we make use of a database of daily 
frequency of yields on 10-year government bonds issued by five EMU countries (Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, Portugal and Spain), covering the entire history of the EMU from its inception on 1 January 
1999 until 31 December 2010. In the first step, we explore the pair-wise Granger-causal 
relationship between yields, both for the whole sample and for changing subsamples of the data, in 
order to capture the possible time-varying causal relationship. This approach allows us to detect 
episodes of significant increase in Granger-causality between yields on bonds issued by different 
countries. In the second step, we study the determinants of these episodes, analyzing the role 
played by different factors, paying special attention to instruments that capture the total national 
debt (domestic and foreign) in each country.  
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1. Introduction 
 
After ten years of stability, the financial and economic crisis that followed the US subprime crisis 
and Lehman Brothers collapse highlighted the imbalances within the European Economic and 
Monetary Union (EMU) countries. These imbalances had probably been undervalued during the 
stability period when markets seemed to underestimate the possibility that governments might 
default. Nevertheless, from August 2007 onwards, in parallel with the rise in global financial 
instability that led to a “flight-to-quality”, yield spreads of euro area issues with respect to Germany 
spiraled (see Figure 1). Moreover, since 2010, Greece has been bailed out twice and the Republic of 
Ireland and Portugal also needed bailouts to stay afloat. These events brought to light the fact that 
the origin of sovereign debt crises in Europe could even go beyond the imbalances in public 
finances. 
 
Indeed, the main causes of the debt crises in Europe vary according to the country and reflect an 
important interconnection between public and private debt. In Ireland, the crisis was mainly due to 
the private sector, particularly a domestic housing boom which was financed by foreign borrowers 
who did not require a risk premium related to the probability of default (see Lane, 2011). In Spain, 
since absorption exceeded production, the external debt grew and the real exchange rate 
appreciated, implying a loss of competitiveness for the economy. Unlike previous expansions, the 
resort to financing was not led by the public sector but by private households and firms. In contrast 
to Ireland and Spain, the origin of the debt crisis in Greece and Portugal was the structural deficit in 
the government sector. If the crisis spreads to Italy, this structural deficit would be the possible 
cause. Greece and Italy’s large fiscal deficit and huge public debt are the cumulative result of 
chronic macroeconomic imbalances1. However, the case of Portugal illustrates the importance of 
external debt2 (specifically, that of its private sector: banks and enterprises).  
 
                                                          
1 As pointed out in Gómez-Puig (2006 and 2008), in the past, Italy may have benefited from the fact that “size matters for liquidity” and 
thus for the success of a sovereign debt market since at the end of 2010 its market was the biggest in the euro area (see Table 6).  
2 The current account deficit over GDP was 9.86% in December 2010. 
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Some studies have already found a strong relationship between risk premium and a wide range of 
vulnerability indicators that go beyond the fiscal position. The IMF (2010) and Barrios et al. (2009) 
present empirical evidence of the strong relationship between current account deficits and foreign 
debt and the behavior of sovereign risk premium. Moreover, Gros (2011) contends that foreign 
debt is more important than public debt, and that this may have a number of implications for the 
ongoing eurozone crisis3.  
 
Other authors (Bolton and Jeanne (2011) and Allen et al. (2011), to name a few), have focused on 
the study of cross-border banking system linkages to the government sector. Although, cross-
border banking effect on risk diversification is a key benefit, foreign capital is likely to be more 
mobile than domestic capital and, in a crisis situation, foreign banks may simply decide to “cut and 
run”. In addition, in an integrated banking system, financial or sovereign crisis in a country can 
quickly spill over to other countries. In this context, it is important to note that the European 
Union and, especially the euro area, witnessed a significant increase in cross-border financial activity 
over the ten years before the global crisis (see Barnes, Lane and Radziwill, 2010). Both the 
elimination of currency risk and regulatory convergence4 can explain this important increase (see 
Kalemli-Ozcan, Papaioannou and Peydró-Alcalde, 2009). Spiegel (2009a and 2009b) shows that the 
effect of the monetary union has been even stronger for some of the peripheral EMU countries. In 
particular, the sources of external financing for Portuguese and Greek banks radically shifted on 
joining the euro; traditionally reliant on dollar debt, these banks were subsequently able to raise 
funds from their counterparts elsewhere in the EMU. 
 
Therefore, in this scenario of increased cross-border financial activity in the euro area, Gray et al. 
(2008) point out the importance of identifying the channels that connect the banking and the 
sovereign sectors, not only within a country but across countries as well. On the one hand, a 
                                                          
3 This author points out that the importance of external debt is due to the fact that euro area governments retain full sovereignty over 
the taxation of their citizens, but they are bound by existing treaties and international norms and do not have a free hand in taxing non-
citizens. Therefore, euro countries can always service their domestic debt, even without access to the printing press, but not their external 
debt.    
4 The introduction of the Single Banking License in 1989 through the Second Banking Directive was a decisive step towards a unified 
European financial market, which subsequently led to a convergence in financial legislation and regulation across member countries. 
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systemic banking crisis can induce a contraction of the entire economy, weakening public finances 
and thus transferring the distress to the government. This effect is amplified when the financial 
sector has state guarantees. As a feedback effect, risk is further transmitted to holders of sovereign 
debt. On the other hand, macroeconomic imbalances in a specific country lead to rising sovereign 
spreads and a devaluation of the government debt that is mirrored in banks’ balance sheets. 
Moreover, as the recent European sovereign debt crisis has stressed, transmission of the crisis in 
one country to others through the banking system can be a major issue. 
 
The recent literature on sovereign debt has not studied these linkages in depth. Only a handful of 
recent papers have addressed the interaction between sovereign default and the stability of the 
domestic financial system. The analyses by Mody (2009), Ejsing and Lemke (2009), Gennaioli, 
Martin and Rossi (2010) and Broner, Martin and Ventura (2010), are among them5. The papers 
most closely related to our analysis are the studies by Bolton and Jeanne (2011) and Andenmatten 
and Brill (2011). Bolton and Jeanne’s (2011) central issue is the analysis of the international 
contagion caused by the banks’ exposure to the sovereign risk of foreign countries. To that end, 
they use data from the 2010 European stress test and show that financial integration without fiscal 
integration results in an inefficient equilibrium supply of government debt6. Andenmatten and Brill 
(2011) perform a bivariate test for contagion that is based on an approach proposed by Forbes and 
Rigobon (2002) to examine whether the co-movement of sovereign CDS premium increased 
significantly after the beginning of the Greek debt crisis in October 2009. Unlike Forbes and 
Rigobon, they conclude that in European countries “both contagion and interdependence” 
occurred.  
 
However, an important constraint in the above-mentioned empirical evidence is the fact that it 
ignores the dynamic component of the degree of interconnection of public debt markets. In this 
                                                          
5 Beakert et al. (2011) analyze the transmission of crises to country-industry equity portfolios in 55 countries, using the 2007-2009 
financial crisis as a laboratory. 
6
The same conclusion is reached by Gros and Mayer (2011) who say that “The EU resembles a group of highly interdependent 
companies with large cross-holdings of equity stakes. However, the formal structure of the group is very light. There is no central 
authority that can give orders to individual members of the group”. They conclude that the euro area can no longer avoid a stark choice: 
“either it sticks to the limited liability character of EMU (but in this case sovereign default becomes likely), or it moves towards a fiscal 
union with a mutual guarantee for the public debt of all member countries”.   
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regard, Abad, Chuliá and Gómez-Puig (2010 and 2012) examine the European government bond 
market integration from a dynamic perspective, applying an asset pricing model to a dataset 
spanning the years 2004 to 20097. Nonetheless, the evolution of the time-varying degree of causality 
of EMU sovereign debt yields behavior (and the factors behind it, especially the role played by 
private debt and cross-border banking linkages) has not yet been analyzed in sufficient depth by the 
literature. This paper aims to carry out an analysis of this kind.  
 
Thus, the main objectives of this paper are threefold: (1) to test for the existence of possible 
Granger-causal relationships between the evolution of the yield of bonds issued by peripheral EMU 
countries, (2) to examine the time-varying nature of these Granger-causal relationships and to 
detect episodes of significant intensification in causality between them, and (3) to analyze the 
determinants of those events considering not only macroeconomic imbalances, but also the role 
played by market liquidity, private debt, cross-border banking linkages, indicators of investor 
sentiment and global risk aversion. This paper also makes three main contributions to the existing 
literature. First, it presents a dynamic approach to the analysis of the evolution of the degree of 
Granger-causality of EMU sovereign debt yields behavior. Second, it makes use of a unique dataset 
on private debt-to-GDP by sector (households, banks and non-financial corporations) in each 
EMU country and on cross-border banking linkages. Private debt dataset has been built up by the 
authors using the Monetary Financial Institutions (MFI) balance sheet statistics provided for each 
euro country by the European Central Bank, whilst cross border banking linkages are measured 
using the consolidated claims on an immediate borrower basis of Bank for International 
Settlements reporting banks (in the public, the banking and the non-financial private sectors). 
Third, it focuses the analysis on peripheral EMU countries (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and 
Spain) since these are the countries which have come under market pressure since 2009, reflecting 
investors’ perceptions of risks, and which to a large extent have been the origin of the current 
sovereign debt crisis in the whole eurozone.  
                                                          
7 Their results suggest that, from the beginning of the financial market tensions in August 2007, markets moved towards higher 
segmentation, and the differentiation of country risk factors increased substantially across countries. Although the levels were very low, 
the persistence of positive yield spreads against Germany detected before the beginning of the crisis (see Gómez-Puig, 2009a and 2009b) 
was still a reflection of incomplete integration in EMU bond markets. 
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The most important results of the analysis can be summarized as follows. Firstly, we provide 
empirical evidence of the existence of sub-periods of Granger-causality in all pair-wise 
relationships. Secondly, we also present empirical evidence which indicates that the Granger-
causality relationships between peripheral EMU yields have significantly increased during the recent 
crises in sovereign debt markets from 2009. Thirdly, the results of the Probit models estimated to 
analyze the determinants of the episodes of Granger-causality intensification show that in all cases 
the variable that captures cross-border banking linkages is statistically significant. This finding 
might suggest that, not only macroeconomic imbalances may be key determinants of the probability 
of occurrence of those episodes, but in a scenario of increased international financial activity in the 
euro area, transmission of the crisis in one country to other countries through the banking system 
can be a major issue. Lastly, the results support the important role played by private debt, especially 
in the cases of Ireland, Italy and Spain. 
  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the Granger-causality analysis and 
our approach for the detection of episodes of increase in Granger-causality. In Section 3 we carry 
out the exploration of the determinants of these episodes. Finally, Section 4 summarizes the 
findings and offers some concluding remarks.  
 
2. Granger-causality analysis 
2. 1. Econometric methodology  
 
The concept of Granger-causality was introduced by Granger (1969) and Sims (1972) and is widely 
used to ascertain the importance of the interaction between two series. The central notion is one of 
predictability (Hoover, 2001): one variable Granger-causes some other variable, given an 
information set, if past information about the former can improve the forecast of the latter based 
only in its own past information. Therefore, the knowledge of one series evolution reduces the 
forecast errors of the other, suggesting that the latter does not evolve independently of the former.  
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Testing Granger causality typically employs the same lags for all variables. This poses a potential 
problem, since Granger-causality tests are sensitive to lag length. Therefore, it is important that the 
lengths selected should be the right ones to avoid inconsistently estimating the model and drawing 
misleading inferences (see, Thornton and Batten, 1985). In determining the optimal lag structure 
for each variable, we follow Hsiao’s (1981) sequential method to test for causality, which combines 
Akaike’s final predictive error (FPE, from now on) and the definition of Granger-causality8. 
Essentially, the FPE criterion trades off bias that arises from under-parameterization of a model 
against a loss in efficiency resulting from over-parameterization of the model, removing us from the 
ambiguities of the conventional procedure.  
 
Consider the following models,  
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where Xt and Yt  are stationary variables [i.e., they are I(0) variables]. The following steps are used 
to apply Hsiao’s procedure for testing Granger-causality: 
i) Treat Xt as a one-dimensional autoregressive process (1), and compute its FPE with the 
order of lags m varying from 1 to m9. Choose the order which yields the smallest FPE, say 
m, and denote the corresponding FPE as FPEX (m, 0). 
ii) Treat Xt as a controlled variable with m number of lags, and treat Yt as a manipulated 
variable as in (2). Compute again the FPE of (2) by varying the order of lags of Yt from 1 
to n, and determine the order which gives the smallest FPE, say n, and denote the 
corresponding FPE as FPEX (m,n)10. 
                                                          
8 Thornton and Batten (1985) show that the Akaike’s FPE criterion performs well relative to other statistical techniques. 
9
 FPEX(m,0)  is computed using the formula: 1( ,0) · ,
1
X
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 
where T is the total number of observations and SSR is the 
sum of squared residuals of OLS regression (1) 
10 FPEX(m,n)  is computed using the formula: 1( , ) · ,
1
X
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
  
where T is the total number of observations and SSR is 
the sum of squared residuals of OLS regression (2) 
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iii) Compare FPEX (m, 0) with FPEX (m,n) [i.e., compare the smallest FPE in step (i) with the 
smallest FPE in step (ii)]. If FPEX (m,0) > FPEX (m,n), then Yt is said to cause Xt. If FPEX 
(m,0) < FPEX (m,n), then Xt is an independent process. 
iv) Repeat steps i) to iii) for the Yt variable, treating Xt as the manipulated variable. 
 
When Xt and Yt are not stationary variables, but are first-difference stationary [i.e., they are I(1) 
variables] and cointegrated (see Dolado et al., 1990), it is possible to investigate the existence of a 
Granger-causal relationships from ∆Xt to ∆Yt and from ∆Yt to ∆Xt, using the following error 
correction models: 
 
0
1
m
t i t i t
i
X X  

                                      (3) 
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 
                  (4) 
where Zt is the OLS residual of the cointegrating regression ( t tX Y   ), known as the error-
correction term. Note that, if Xt and Yt are I (1) variables, but they are not cointegrated, then β in 
(4) is assumed to be equal to zero. 
 
In both cases [i.e., Xt  and Yt  are I(1) variables, and they are or are not cointegrated], we can use 
Hsiao’s sequential procedure substituting Xt with ∆Xt and Yt with ∆Yt in steps i) to iv), as well as 
substituting expressions (1) and (2) with equations (3) and (4). Proceeding in this way, we ensure 
efficiency since the system is congruent and encompassing (Hendry and Mizon, 1999). 
 
2. 2. Data  
 
We use daily data of 10-year bond yields from 1 January 1999 to 31 December 2010 collected from 
Thomson Reuters Datastream for EMU peripheral countries: Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and 
Spain. Figures 1a and 1b plot the evolution of daily 10-year sovereign bond yields and their spread 
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against the bund for each country in our sample. A simple look at these figures indicates the 
differences in the yields behavior before and after the financial crisis of 2008.  
 
[Insert Figures 1a and 1b here] 
 
Specifically, it is remarkable that after the introduction of the euro in January 1999 and until the 
subprime crisis in global financial markets in August 2007, spreads on bonds of EMU peripheral 
countries moved in a narrow range with only slight differentiation across countries. In fact, the 
stability and convergence of spreads was considered a hallmark of successful financial integration 
inside the euro area. Nevertheless, after the subprime crisis in 2007, severe tensions emerged in 
financial markets worldwide, including the EMU bond market. Moreover, following the collapse of 
the US financial institution Lehman Brothers on 15 September 2008, the financial turmoil turned 
into a global financial crisis which began to spread to the real sector.  
 
Therefore, the financial crisis highlighted the imbalances within the euro area and yield spreads 
between government bond issues of participating countries, which had reached levels close to zero 
between 2003 and 2007 (the average value of the 10-year yield spread against the German bund 
moved between -4 and 20 basis points, in the case of Ireland and Greece, respectively), reemerged. 
Indeed, the risk premium on EMU government bonds increased strongly in 2008, reflecting 
investor perceptions of upcoming risks. Concretely, Figure 1b displays that by the end of 
December 2010 it reached levels of 952 basis points in Greece, 580 in Ireland, 380 in Portugal, 255 
in Spain and 182 in Italy.  
 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the levels and differences of the 10-year government’s 
yield in peripheral EMU countries during the sample period (1999-2010). As can be seen, the mean 
is not significantly different from zero for the first differences. Normality is tested with the Jarque-
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Bera test (which is distributed as χ2(2) under the null) and strongly rejected for both the levels and 
first differences. Since rejection could be due to either excess of kurtosis or skewness, we report 
these statistics separately in Table 1. Given that the kurtosis of the normal distribution is 3, our 
results suggest that the distribution of the yields of Greece and Ireland, as well as all the first 
differences, are peaked relative to the normal, while the distribution of the yields in the cases of 
Italy, Portugal and Spain are flat relative to the normal. Finally, regarding the asymmetry of the 
distribution of the series around their mean, we find positive skewness for all the variables in levels 
and for the first difference in the case of Italy, suggesting that their distributions have long right 
tails, whilst in the cases of the first differences of yields for Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain 
there is evidence of negative skewness and therefore of distributions with long left tails.  
 
2.3. Preliminary results 
 
As a first step, we tested for the order of integration of the 10-year bond yields by means of the 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests. The results, shown in Table 2, decisively reject the null 
hypothesis of non stationarity, suggesting that both variables can be treated as first-difference 
stationary11.  
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
Following Carrion-i-Silvestre et al. (2001)’s suggestion, we confirm this result using the Kwiatkowski 
et al. (1992) (KPSS) tests, where the null is a stationary process against the alternative of a unit root. 
As can be seen in Table 3, the results fail to reject the null hypothesis of stationarity in first 
differences, but strongly reject it in levels. 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
                                                          
11 These results were confirmed using Phillips-Perron (1998) unit root tests controlling for serial correlation and the Elliott, Rothenberg, 
and Stock (1996) Point Optimal and Ng and Perron (2001) unit root tests for testing non-stationarity against the alternative of high 
persistence. These additional results are not shown here to save space, but they are available from the authors upon request.  
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As a second step, we tested for cointegration between each of the 10 pair combinations12 of 
peripheral EMU yields using Johansen (1991, 1995)’s approach. An important decision in this 
approach is whether to include deterministic terms in the cointegrating Vector Autoregressive  
(VAR) model. Deterministic terms, such as the intercept, linear trend, and indicator variables, play a 
crucial role in both data behavior and limiting distributions of estimators and tests in integrated 
processes. Banerjee et al. (1993), Johansen (1994) and Nielsen and Rahbek (2000) show that the 
statistical properties of the commonly used test procedure are affected, indicating that in some 
cases its size cannot be controlled, and that in others there is substantial power loss. Depending on 
their presence or absence, the system may manifest drift, linear trends in cointegration vectors, or 
even quadratic trends. In practical work, there seem to be only two relevant model representations 
for the analysis of cointegration amongst most economic time series variables:   
i. the level data have no deterministic trend and the cointegrating equations have 
intercepts; and  
ii. the level and the cointegrating equations have linear trends.  
 
Table 1 shows that the hypothesis of the expected values of the first differences of the series is 
equal to zero cannot be rejected; hence, there is no evidence of linear deterministic trends in the 
data. The graphs in Figure 1a support this finding. Therefore, we conclude that the cointegrated 
VAR model should be formulated according to i), with the constant term restricted to the 
cointegration space, and no deterministic trend terms. This implies that some equilibrium means are 
different from zero.  
 
As can be seen in Table 4, only for the Greece-Ireland and Greece-Portugal cases do the trace test 
indicate the existence of one cointegrating equation at (at least) the 0.05 level. Therefore, for these 
two pairs we test for Granger-causality in first differences of the variables, with an error-correction 
term added [i. e., equations (3) and (4)], whereas for the remaining cases, we test for Granger-
                                                          
12 Recall that the number of possible pairs between our sample of five peripheral EMU yields is given by the following formula 
! 5!
10.
!( )! 2!(5 2)!
n
r n r
 
 
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causality in first differences of the variables, with no error-correction term added [i. e., equations (3) 
and (4) with β=0] 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
 
2.4. Empirical results 
The resulting FPE statistics for the whole sample are reported in Table 5.13 
 [Insert Table 5 here] 
 
As can be seen, in most of the cases our results suggest bidirectional Granger-causality. We do not 
find unidirectional Granger-causality relationships running from Greece to Spain, from Italy to 
Ireland or from Portugal to Ireland. 
 
Note that, even though the results of the cointegration tests reject (with only two exceptions) a 
long-run relationship between them, we find evidence of strong Granger-causal linkages between 
peripheral EMU yields. Therefore, each yield series contains useful information that is not present 
in the others which can help to explain the others’ short-run evolution.  
 
 
In order to gain further insights into the dynamic Granger-causality between the 20 possible 
relationships in peripheral EMU yields, we carry out 33,486 rolling regressions using a window of 
200 observations14. In each estimation, we apply Hsiao (1981)’s sequential procedure outlined 
above to determine the optimum FPE (m, 0) and FPE (m, n) statistics in each case. 
  
                                                          
13 These results were confirmed using both Wald statistics to test the joint hypothesis 
1 2
ˆ ˆ ˆ... 0n       in equation (4) and 
Williams-Kloot test for forecasting accuracy (Williams, 1959). These additional results are not shown here to save space, but they are 
available from the authors upon request.  
14 To the best of our knowledge, there is no statistical method to set the optimal window size. The chosen value of 200 observations is 
representative of the one used in practice and seems appropriate for our empirical application since it represents 6.36% of the sample. 
We have also used a value of 100 observations. The results (not shown here to save space, but they are available from the authors upon 
request.) render the same qualitative conclusions than in the case of using 200 observations. 
 
  
12 
A graphic presentation of the evolution of the difference between FPE (m, 0) and FPE (m, n) 
statistics in each case is shown in Figure 2. Concretely, Figure 2a to Figure 2e present the FPE 
sequence from rolling regressions running from Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain, 
respectively. Therefore, these graphs provide us with a view of the dynamic influence of each EMU 
peripheral yield over the other four and constitute our indicator of time-varying Granger-causality. 
Adopting a forward-looking framework, we assign the computed indicator to the first date used in 
the rolling regressions. Therefore, the sample covers the period 1 January 1999 to 26 March 2010 in 
all cases, except in those pairs where Greece is present, in which case the sample runs from 1 
January 2001 to 26 March 2010. Note that if the difference is positive in the case XX → YY, this 
indicates the existence of a statistically significant Granger-causality relationship running from 
country XX towards country YY.  
 
As can be seen, we find sub-periods of Granger-causality in all pair-wise relationships, including 
those running from Greece to Spain, from Italy to Ireland and Portugal to Ireland, even though 
these relationships were rejected when we performed the tests for the whole sample. In other 
words, we detect, in all cases, sub-periods where the yields on bonds issued by one peripheral EMU 
country carries relevant and useful information about the future behaviour of the yields on bonds 
issued by other peripheral EMU country.   
 
We proceed further by identifying sub-periods of significant increase in Granger-causality in order 
to be able to analyze which factors may have been behind them. To that aim, we identify episodes 
of Granger-causality intensification as those in which the time-varying Granger-causality indicator is 
greater than its average plus two standard errors15. Therefore, we look for episodes where there is 
evidence of an enlargement in the information content of the yield series to significantly improve 
the explanatory power of future evolution of the other yield series, suggesting a strengthening of 
their interdependence. 
                                                          
15 We perform formal tests to evaluate whether the series have the same mean during the detected episodes and the rest of the 
observations. The results of these tests (not shown here, but available from the authors upon request) strongly reject the null hypothesis 
of equal mean across sub-samples, and provide additional support for the presence of increased Granger-causality. 
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The graphs in Figure 2 suggest that these episodes are concentrated around the first year of the 
existence of the EMU in 1999, the introduction of euro coins and banknotes in 2002, and the 
global financial crisis of the late-2000s. As can be seen, the graphs also indicate that the Granger-
causality relationships between peripheral EMU yields increased significantly during the recent 
crises in sovereign debt markets since 2009, providing evidence of a reinforcement of the 
interconnection between them. 
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
 
3. Determinants of episodes of Granger-causality intensification  
 
3.1. Econometric methodology  
Once the episodes of Granger-causality intensification have been detected, we use Probit models to 
analyze their determinants. In our case, we define a new dependent variable (y) that takes the value 
one if we have detected such episode and zero otherwise. The goal is to quantify the relationship 
between a set of instruments (X) characterizing the two countries involved in an episode of 
Granger-causality intensification and the probability of occurrence of such event (y).  
 
To this end, we adopt a specification designed to handle the particular requirements of binary 
dependent variables. Suppose that we model the probability of observing a value of one as: 
                  Pr (y = 1| X, β) = 1 –  (–X’ β) =  (X’ β)                      (5) 
 
where  is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution. As can be 
seen, we adopt the standard simplifying convention of assuming that the index specification is 
linear in the parameters so that it takes the form X’β. 
 
3.2. Instruments to model the Granger-causality intensification 
According to Dornbusch, Park, and Claessens (2000), reasons that may explain the evolution of 
yield’s Granger-causality between countries can be divided into two groups: fundamental-based 
reasons on the one hand, and investor behavior-based reasons on the other. While fundamental-
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based transmission works through real and financial linkages across countries, behavior-based is 
more sentiment-driven. Therefore, in our analysis we will use instruments that capture both of 
them. Following the literature, in order to measure fundamental reasons, we not only use 
instruments that gauge each country’s component of risk, but also instruments that asses the global 
component of risk. To that end, on the one hand, we use instruments that capture the country’s 
fiscal position, the market liquidity in each country, the foreign debt, the country’s potential rate of 
growth, the loss of competitiveness, the private sector indebtedness and, especially the cross-border 
banking system linkages. And on the other hand, we use an indicator of global risk aversion. 
 
Concretely, the variables used to measure the country’s fiscal position are the government debt-to-
GDP (GOVDEB) and the government deficit-to-GDP (DEF). These two variables have been 
widely used in the literature by other authors (see, e.g., Bayoumi et al., 1995) and present the 
advantage over the credit rating that they cannot be considered ex post measures of fiscal 
sustainability. Since they are measures of credit risk, they should be directly related to the 
probability of Granger-causality intensification. They are compiled from Eurostat, and monthly 
data are linearly interpolated from quarterly observations.  
 
Regarding liquidity premium in each sovereign debt market, empirical papers examining the 
influence of market liquidity in bond markets use different measures to gauge its three main 
dimensions (tightness, depth and resiliency): trading volume; bid-ask spreads; the outstanding 
amount of debt securities; or the issue size of the specific bond. However, several studies have 
shown that all liquidity measures are closely related to each other (Korajczyk and Sadka (2008), 
Gómez-Puig(2006) and Gerlach et al. (2010) to name a few).   
 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
 
Moreover, Table 6 shows that very important size differences can be observed among peripheral 
euro-area debt markets in our sample period. Concretely, at the end of 2010, the Italian market, 
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with a market share of 24.1% (surpassing the German market), was the biggest in the euro-area; the 
Spanish and the Greek market accounted, respectively, for 9.3% and 4.5% of the total; whilst the 
Portuguese and the Irish were very small markets (they only accounted for 2.2% and 1.5% of the 
total). Therefore, given (i) the empirical evidence that suggest that there is a common component 
among different measures of liquidity and (ii) the large size differences observed between EMU 
peripheral sovereign debt markets, it is likely that the overall outstanding volume of sovereign debt 
(which is considered a measure of market depth because larger markets may present lower 
information costs since their securities are likely to trade frequently, and a relative large number of 
investors may own or may have analyzed their features) might be a good proxy of liquidity 
differences among markets. Indeed, some literature supports the importance of market size in the 
success of a debt market16. Nevertheless, there is another reason to choose this variable: it might 
capture an additional benefit of large markets to the extent that the “too big to fail theory” 
(TFTF)17, taken from the banking system, might also hold in sovereign debt markets. The overall 
outstanding amounts of public debt data (LIQ) have been taken from the Bank for International 
Settlements and monthly data have been interpolated from quarterly observations. Since liquidity 
premium decreases with market size, we would expect a positive effect of this variable on the 
probability of a rise in causality among yields of countries that present small and medium debt 
markets’ size (Ireland, Portugal, Greece and Spain), and a negative effect in the relationships where 
Italy is involved since its large market size may have benefited this country twice: (a) its liquidity 
premium would be smaller and (b) according to the TBTF theory its large market size might have 
preserved this debt market from excessive turbulent speculative attacks.   
 
Besides, the current-account-balance-to-GDP ratio (CAC) is the instrument used as a proxy of the 
foreign debt and the net position of the country towards the rest of the world. Note that CAC is 
                                                          
16 McCauley and Remolona (2000) note that if substantial fixed costs are involved in the production of information about the future 
path of interest rates, the size of the whole debt market matters. They calculate that there may be a size threshold around $100-200 
billions, below which sustaining a liquid government market may not be easy. Among peripheral EMU countries, Table 6 shows that two 
countries were below this threshold: Ireland and Portugal. Economides and Siow (1988) point out that there may be a trade-off between 
liquidity and market size. The smaller the debt market, the more difficult it will be for investors to process and evaluate information 
about securities and the higher the transaction costs and the liquidity premium. Finally, Gómez-Puig (2006) presents empirical evidence 
that supports the idea that after the removal of the exchange rate risk in 1999, in the context of increased competition among euro-area 
government securities’ markets, their success might have been limited by the extent of their liquidity and market size.  
 
17 Goodhart and Huang (2005) develop a model of the lender of last resort from a Central Bank viewpoint. Consistent with the TBTF 
theory, their model suggests that the Central Bank will only rescue banks which are above a threshold size. 
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defined as the difference between exports and imports. Therefore an increase in CAC would signal 
an improvement in the net position of the country towards the rest of the world, reducing the 
probability of Granger-causality intensification in pair-wise relationships. The importance of this 
variable has been underlined by the IMF (2010) and Barrios et al. (2009). This variable is drawn 
from the OECD and monthly data are linearly interpolated from quarterly observations. In view of 
Mody (2009)’s argument that countries’ sensitivity to the financial crisis is more pronounced the 
greater the loss of growth potential and competitiveness, we include instruments that measure these 
features. The unemployment rate (U), which has been collected from Eurostat, is the variable used 
to capture the country’s growth potential, whilst the Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices 
monthly interannual rate of growth (which has also been drawn from Eurostat) is the inflation rate 
measure (INF) we use as a proxy of the appreciation of the real exchange rate and, thus, the 
country’s loss of competitiveness. An increase in both the unemployment rate (U) or the inflation 
rate (INF) represents a deterioration of growth potential and competitiveness; so, it will augment 
the probability of occurrence of a Granger-causality intensification episode.  
 
To assess the interconnection between the public and private debt and the role of the latter in the 
euro area sovereign debt crisis, we also incorporate instruments that capture the level of 
indebtedness of each country’s private sector in the analysis. To that end, we make use of a unique 
dataset on private debt-to-GDP by sector (households, banks and non-financial corporations) in 
each EMU country. In particular, we use three variables: Banks’ debt-to-GDP (BANDEB), non-
financial corporations’ debt-to-GDP (NFIDEB), and households’ debt-to-GDP (HOUDEB), 
which have been constructed with data obtained from the European Central Bank Statistics. Since 
high leverage levels in the private sector have a negative impact in the public sector’s sustainability, 
an increase in these three variables would affect positively to the probability of Granger-causality 
intensification. A summary of their evolution is presented in Table 7. Concretely, we have used the 
statistics corresponding to the Monetary Financial Institutions (MFI) balance sheets in each euro 
country. Thus, household debt corresponds to the total loans to households from MFIs. To isolate 
it from the intermediation effect that would inflate debt ratios, banks’ debt is constructed by 
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subtracting M3, banks’ remaining liabilities and banks’ capital and reserves from total MFI 
liabilities18. And non-financial corporation debt is built up by adding non-financial corporation 
securities to total loans to non-financial corporations from MFIs19. 
 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
 
Table 7 clearly shows the importance of private debt in the ongoing crisis. Concretely, after the 
subprime crisis in August 2007, not only does the government level of indebtedness increase in the 
euro area (the ratio over the GDP achieves levels of 143%, 119%, 96%, 93% and 60% at the end of 
December 2010 in Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal and Spain, respectively) but private borrowing 
also registers a sizeable increase. In particular, as can be observed, at the end of 2010, banks’ debt-
to-GDP is huge in Ireland (729%), but is also high in Portugal, Spain and Greece (182%, 159% and 
98%). On the other hand, households’ debt-to-GDP surpasses the 80% threshold in Ireland, 
Portugal and Spain, whilst non-financial corporations’ debt-to-GDP is close to 90% in Portugal and 
Spain and around 70% in Ireland. Thus, during the period 2007-2010, whereas the government 
debt-to-GDP ratio registers the highest increases compared to the period 2002-2006 in Ireland, 
Portugal and Greece (39%, 15% and 9%), there is a much steeper rise in the banks’ debt-to-GDP 
ratio which is higher than 150% in Greece, close to 70% in Ireland, around 64% in Spain and close 
to 40% in Portugal. Besides, households’ debt-to-GDP ratio registers an increase close to 30% in 
Greece, close to 20% in Ireland and Spain and around 15% in Italy, whilst non-financial 
corporations’ debt-to-GDP ratio rises close to 30%, 25% and 20% in Ireland, Spain and Greece 
respectively. 
 
As it has already been mentioned, some authors (Bolton and Jeanne (2011) and Allen et al. (2011) 
among them) outline that, in an scenario of increased international financial activity in the euro 
                                                          
18
 The banks’ debt variable we have constructed avoids the effects of intermediation, even though it can only be considered as an 
approximation of its real value, and some caveats are in order: specifically, some deposits will appear as debt (those not included in M3) 
and some debt securities will not be considered debt (those included in M3). 
19 Non-financial corporations’ (NFCs) debt should also include “net equity of households” (liabilities of NFCs from direct pension 
commitments to their employees). Nevertheless, we have ignored this variable since it was not available for all the countries in the 
sample. 
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area, not only public finances imbalances are key determinants of the probability that the sovereign 
debt crisis could spill over from one country to another, but that transmission of the crisis through 
the banking system can also be a major issue. Therefore, in our analysis we also include variables 
that capture the important cross-border banking system linkages in euro area countries, which 
might influence positively the probability of occurrence of a causality intensification episode. These 
linkages are measured using the consolidated claims on an immediate borrower basis of Bank for 
International Settlements (BIS) reporting banks in the public, banking and non-financial private 
sectors as a proportion of GDP (monthly data are linearly interpolated from quarterly 
observations). In particular, we include foreign bank claims on government debt-to-GDP (PUB), 
on bank debt-to-GDP (BAN) and on non-financial private sector debt-to-GDP (PRI). The 
evolution of these variables is summarized in Table 8. 
 
 [Insert Table 8 here] 
 
The figures in Table 8 underline the fact that, as it was mentioned in the Introduction, the causes of 
the debt crises that led to subsequent rescues in Europe varied substantially according to country. 
Greek fiscal deficit and public debt to GDP were close to 15% and 130% at the end of 2009 as a 
result of chronic macroeconomic imbalances. Besides, on average, foreign banks’ claims on its 
public sector debt represented around 30% of its GDP during the period 2005-2010. Conversely, in 
Ireland, the crisis was mainly due to the private sector, particularly the domestic housing boom 
which was financed by foreign borrowing. In particular, the amount of bank and non-financial 
enterprise debt claimed by foreign banks is huge during the period 2005-2010 (102% and 216% of 
its GDP, on average). Finally, in Portugal, markets were mostly worried about the country’s high 
external debt, specifically, that of its non-financial corporations. During the 2005-2010 period, 
foreign banks’ claims on Portuguese enterprises surpassed 40% of the country’s GDP.   
 
Moreover, we also explore the role of consolidated claims on an immediate borrower basis 
provided by BIS by nationality of reporting banks as a proportion of total foreign claims on each 
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country. This variable is denoted as XXYYBAN, meaning the percentage of the total foreign claims 
on country XX held by country YY’s banks (again, monthly data have been linearly interpolated 
from quarterly observations). We expect that higher banking sector exposure would be associated 
with higher probability of observing an episode of increased pair-wise Granger-causality. 
 
[Insert Table 9 here] 
 
This information is displayed in Table 9 and is very useful for understanding the channels of 
transmission of debt crises through the banking system. It can be observed that at the end of 2010 
French and German banks were the most exposed to foreign Greek debt, holding 39.6% and 
23.7% of total foreign Greek claims respectively. In the case of Ireland, the maximum risk was 
borne by British banks (29.9%) followed by the Germans (26.13%). A Portuguese default would be 
especially harmful for Spanish banks which hold 41.9% of Portuguese banks’ total claims. Finally, 
around 45% and close to 65% of Spanish and Italian foreign claims, respectively, are held by 
French and German banks.      
 
As mentioned, we also introduce an instrument that might capture investor behavior-based reasons 
of crisis’s transmission. We use the credit rating as a proxy of the default risk (RAT). Standard 
&Poor’s, Moody’s and Fitch ratings for each government’s debt are compiled from Bloomberg. 
Following Blanco (2001), we build up a scale to gauge the effect of investor sentiment based on the 
rating offered by the three agencies20. Since this variable is considered an ex post measure of fiscal 
sustainability it should have a positive impact on the probability of occurrence of a causality 
intensification episode. 
 
Moreover, several studies show that sovereign bond yields are not only driven by country-specific 
risk factors but that they are also significantly affected by global risk factors (see Codogno et al. 
(2003), Sgherri and Zoli (2009), Bernoth and Erdogan (2012) among them). These global risk 
                                                          
20 By construction, the higher the scale, the worse the rating categories. 
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factors reflect global investors’ risk aversion, since in times of uncertainty, they become more risk 
averse and the “flight-to-safety” motive favors bonds of countries that are generally regarded to 
have a low default risk. Therefore, an increase in the Granger-causality of bond yields might also 
reflect a general increase in investors’ risk aversion which might drive the yields of the peripheral 
countries simultaneously21. To measure risk aversion in financial markets, we rely on the Chicago 
Board Options Exchange Market Volatility Index (VIX), used by Bloom (2009) to capture 
uncertainty22 (this variable is denoted as RISK)23. 
 
Appendix 1 offers a summary of the explanatory variables used in the empirical analysis as well as 
the data sources.  
 
3.3. Empirical results 
Given that the instruments used as independent variables have been constructed on a monthly 
frequency, we also need to compute the dependent variable in the Probit models on a monthly 
basis. To do so, we first assign a value of 1 to the daily observation if the time-varying Granger-
causality indicator is greater than its average plus two standard errors. In the second step, we 
compute the monthly data by averaging the daily observation and assigning a value of 1 if the 
resulting monthly average is greater than 0.5 (i. e., if at least for half of the month there is evidence 
of Granger-causality intensification).  
 
We follow the general to specific approach characteristic of the London School of Economics 
based on the theory of reduction (Hendry, 1995, ch. 9). Therefore, our empirical analysis starts with 
a general statistical model that captures the essential characteristics of the underlying dataset, 
reducing the complexity of this general model by eliminating statistically insignificant variables, 
                                                          
21 We are very grateful to an anonymous referee for suggesting us this additional determinant factor. 
22 The VIX represents the option-implied expected volatility on the S&P500 index with a horizon of 30 calendar days. In the empirical 
analysis, we use end-of-month VIX levels. As pointed out by Bekaert et al. (2012), the link of VIX to option prices means it also harbours 
information about risk and risk aversion. 
23 Besides, the interaction effects between the global risk indicator and both the liquidity measure and public and private debt-to-GDP in 
each country have also been tested. The results, not reported here to save space but available from the authors upon request, suggest that 
(except for Italy) the effect of an increase in global risk aversion on the probability of Granger-causality intensification in pair-wise 
relationships is magnified by market liquidity conditions. Regarding the interaction between global risk aversion and debt, our findings 
indicate that the incidence of an increase in Governments’, Banks’, Non-financial corporations’ or Households’ debt on the probability 
of Granger-causality intensification in peripheral EMU sovereign yields behavior is amplified in a context of high global risk aversion. 
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checking the validity of the reductions at every stage to ensure congruence of the finally selected 
model. In Table 10 we report the final results of the Probit models estimated by maximum 
likelihood for the sample period March 2005 to March 201024,25,26. The z-statistics in that table are 
based on robust standard errors computed using the Huber-White quasi-maximum likelihood 
method. Following the same criterion that we used in Figure 2, Table 10a to 10e display the results 
of the Probit models estimated for the causal relationship running from Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Portugal and Spain, respectively. 
 
[Insert Table 10 here] 
 
In binary models, estimated coefficients cannot be interpreted as the marginal effect on the 
dependent variable. Therefore, to gain further insights in the influence of the explanatory variables, 
in Table 10 we also show the associated marginal effects to compare their relative impacts. These 
marginal effects measure the influence of a unit change in a given explanatory variable on the 
probability of pair-wise Granger-causality intensification, holding all the other variables constant, 
and have been computed at their average values27.  
 
As expected, our results indicate that the variables used to measure the country’s fiscal position 
(GOVDEB and DEF) are important determinants of the probability of an episode of Granger-
causality’s increase. Specifically, regarding the variable that measures the government deficit (DEF), 
                                                          
24 Note that even though we could be dealing with a binary choice model with I(1) regressors, Park and Phillips (2000) have proved that 
the coefficient estimated by maximum likelihood are still consistent, converging at a rate T3/4 along its principal component, having a 
slower rate of T314 convergence in all other directions. Moreover, this authors showed that the limit distribution of the maximum 
likelihood estimator was mixed normal with mixing variates being dependent upon Brownian local time as well as Brownian motion, so 
the usual inference methods are still valid Grabowski (2007)  have added that when among the regressors include variables with different 
orders of  integration, the rate of convergence of the estimate of the coefficients depend of such order: T314 for stationary regressors and 
T314 for I(1) or I(2) regressors. 
25 The reduction in the sample period is imposed by the availability of data regarding the consolidated claims of Bank for International 
Settlements’ reporting banks on each sector. 
26 The results are very similar for Logit models run on the same data. 
27
 Nevertheless, the direction of the effect of a change in any instrument depends only on the sign of the coefficient estimated: positive 
values imply that an increase in a given instrument will raise the probability of an increase in pair-wise Granger causality, while negative 
values indicate the opposite. 
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it is statistically significant in the four relationships that run from Ireland, Italy and Portugal (see 
Table 10b, 10c and 10d) and in two out of the four  relationships running from Spain (see Table 
10e), whilst the variable that captures the government debt (GOVDEB) is always significant in the 
causal relationships running from Greece (see Table 10a), in two out of the four relationships 
running from Ireland and Spain (see Table 10b and Table 10e), in three of the relationships that run 
from Italy (see Table 10c) and in one relationship running from Portugal (see Table 10d). The 
marginal effects of DEF in the relationship that runs from Portugal to Spain and of GOVDEB in 
the relationship running Greece to Italy are particularly high (0.6197 and 0.5922, respectively), 
stressing the role of the variables that gauge the country’s fiscal position in the occurrence of 
episodes of pair-wise Granger-causality intensification from Greece and Portugal (as mentioned in 
the Introduction, in these two countries, the origin of the sovereign debt crisis were precisely the 
structural fiscal imbalances). 
 
However, our results also indicate that other factors beyond the fiscal position do help to explain 
the episodes of Granger-causality intensification in peripheral EMU public debt markets. Notably, 
three variables are statistically significant in all cases: XXYYBAN, LIQ, and RISK. 
 
The significance of XXYYBAN suggests that, in a scenario of increased cross-border financial 
activity in the euro area, transmission of the crisis in one country to other countries through the 
banking system can really be a major issue. Moreover, its marginal effect is especially high in the 
relationships running from Greece, Italy and Portugal, ranging from 0.3174 to 0.7940 (see Table 
10a, Table 10c and Table 10d, respectively), therefore indicating that a unit increase from mean 
values of these variables notably increase the probability of pair-wise Granger-causality 
intensification. 
 
On the other hand, we find a positive and significant sign for the variable LIQ in the relationships 
where Italy is not involved; whilst in all other causal relationships where Italy is involved, the 
variable LIQ presents a statistically significant negative sign. Consistent with our expectations, these 
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results suggest that liquidity premium decreases with debt market size. Therefore, Italy may have 
benefited from the fact that “size matters for liquidity”, and thus for the success of a sovereign debt 
market, since at the end of 2010 its market was the biggest in the euro area28. Nevertheless, we 
would like to note that the marginal effect of the variable LIQ is very small in all cases, therefore 
indicating that a unit increase from mean values in these variables only marginally affects the 
probability of pair-wise Granger-causality intensification. 
 
Finally, the significance of the variable RISK could be interpreted as evidence supporting the view 
that an increase in investors’ risk aversion boosts transmission of the crisis since the “flight-to-
safety” motive benefits bonds issued by countries that are generally regarded to have a low default 
risk. The marginal effect of this variable is particularly high in the relationships running from 
Greece and Spain (see Table 10a and 10e, respectively) and in explaining the causal relationships 
from Italy and Portugal to Spain (see Table 10c and 10d, respectively), suggesting that the riskier 
the environment, the more likely is the possibility of observing an episode of pair-wise Granger-
causality intensification, particularly if the Spanish debt market is involved. The highest marginal 
effect of this value is found in the relationship that runs from Portugal to Spain (0.4769). 
 
With regard to the role of private debt, we find empirical evidence supporting its importance in the 
cases of Ireland, Italy and Spain. Our results indicate that household’s debt and non-financial-
corporations’ debt constitute relevant determinants in the transmission of the crisis from Italy and 
Spain, respectively (see Tables 10c and 10e); whilst banks’ debt explains Granger-causality 
intensification from Ireland, Italy and Spain (see Tables 10b, 10c and 10e)29. The marginal effects of 
the variable that captures banks’ debt are particularly high in the relationships running from Italy to 
Ireland (0.3227) and Spain (0.4019) and from the four relationships running from Ireland (they 
range from 0.5755 to 0.6256). The results obtained regarding the role played by private debt are 
                                                          
28 Besides, its large debt market size may have benefited Italy twice since the TBTF theory might also hold in sovereigns’ debt markets. 
29 The finding of a significant role of bank’s debt as determinant of Granger-causality intensification could be related to the transfer of 
risk from the banking sector to the public sector, since many governments were called on to support their banking system through direct 
capital injections and indirect balance-sheet support in the form of guarantees. 
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very important in the Spanish and the Irish cases. In this respect, Table 7 shows that at the end of 
2010, the ratio of non-financial corporations’ debt-to-GDP was close to 90% in Spain, whilst the 
ratio of banks’ debt-to-GDP was 729.1% in Ireland. Therefore, as we claimed in the Introduction, 
the results support a central role of private debt, specifically, that hold by non-financial 
corporations and by the banking sector in the transmission of the crisis from Spain and Ireland, 
respectively. In both countries the origin of the debt crisis was mainly due to the private sector, 
being the domestic expansion financed by foreign borrowers. 
 
As for the relevance of foreign bank’s claims on public debt, it is noticeable that this variable is 
statistically significant in all the relationships that run from Ireland (Table 10b), whilst foreign 
bank’s claims on the Irish banking debt is a key determinant in the relationship that runs from 
Greece to Ireland (Table 10a) and from Ireland to Portugal and Spain (Table 10b), although the 
associated the marginal effects are small.  
 
Moreover, the instrument used to gauge the level of competitiveness (INF) is especially relevant 
when explaining the Granger-causality running from Greece (Table 10a) and Portugal (Table 10d), 
being particularly high the marginal effect associated with this variable in the relationship running 
from Greece to Italy (0.3349). On the other hand, the net position towards the rest of the world 
(CAC) is statistically significant with the expected negative sign in three out of the four 
relationships that run from Spain (Table 10e). Regarding the variable used to capture the country’s 
growth potential (the unemployment rate, U), we find that it shows a positive influence in the 
occurrence of an episode of causality intensification, which suggests that the weaker the economy, 
the higher the probability of sovereign debt crisis transmission. This conclusion is particularly 
relevant in the case of Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain (see Tables 10a, 10c, 10d, and 10e). The 
highest marginal effects are obtained when this variable refers to the Spanish and the Italian 
unemployment rate: 0.7300 and 0.7347 in the relationships that run from Spain to Ireland and Italy, 
respectively; and 0.7757 in the relationship that runs from Italy to Spain. 
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The results concerning the influence of investor sentiment indicate that the credit rating scale seems 
to be an important determinant in eleven out of the twenty cases considered. Besides, this variable 
presents an especially high marginal effect in some of the relationships where Italy is involved: from 
Italy to Greece (0.4372) and from Spain to Italy (0.3831). 
 
To sum up, our results suggest that jointly with local risk factors, global risk factors are important 
determinants of the probability of occurrence of an episode of Granger-causality intensification in 
peripheral EMU public debt markets, especially in the relationships where Spain is involved. 
Regarding local risk factors, we found that not only variables that capture the evolution of 
macroeconomic imbalances but also those that gauge investors’ sentiment are statistically 
significant. Specifically, our results support the idea that the euro area crisis faces several 
overlapping and reinforcing elements of fiscal (Greece and Portugal), banking (Ireland and Spain), 
and competitiveness (Southern periphery) crises, since variables that measure fiscal imbalances, 
private sector debt, or loss of competitiveness are particularly relevant in Greece and Portugal, 
Ireland and Spain, and Southern countries, respectively. Furthermore, we found that two variables 
are significant in all Granger-causal relationships examined: cross-border-banking linkages and the 
variable that depicts market liquidity. The relevance of the variable that captures financial linkages 
supports the idea that, in a context of high degree of integration of the banking system, 
transmission of the debt crisis through it has become a major issue to which it would be necessary 
to pay more attention. Besides, since we used the overall outstanding volume of debt in each 
country as a proxy of market liquidity, as expected, we obtained that liquidity premium decreases 
with the size of the market (benefiting large markets like the Italian one).  
 
Finally, in Table 10 we also report the McFadden R-squared as a measure of goodness of the fit. As 
can be seen, it ranges from 0.6994 to 0.9115, suggesting the relative success of the Probit regression 
models in predicting the values of the dependent variable within the sample30. As a further test to 
evaluate how well our estimated Probit models account for the observations, we compute the fitted 
                                                          
30
The same conclusion is reached when performing the Pearson-type test of goodness-of-fit proposed by Hosmer and Lemeshow 
(2000).  
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probability both within-sample and out-of-sample. It should be recalled that, when generating our 
indicator, we left out nine observations (April to December 2010) that were not used in the 
estimation. This allows us to evaluate the out-of-sample performance of the estimated Probit 
models based on the actual evolution of the instrumental variables. Figure 3 reports the results. 
Again, Figure 3a to Figure 3e report the results from the causal relationship running from Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain, respectively. 
 
[Insert Figure 3 here] 
 
As can be seen, the fitted probabilities closely track the evolution of the observed within-sample 
probabilities. Regarding the out-of-sample probabilities, our results suggest the occurrence of an 
additional episode of significant increase of Granger-causality in the last months of 2010 coinciding 
with a period of renewed turbulence in European debt markets (recall that the first rescue of 
Greece took place in May 2010 and that Ireland was rescued in November 2010). 
 
4. Concluding remarks 
 
In the current context of uncertainty in European sovereign debt markets, the analysis presented in 
this paper deals with a subject that has not been addressed deeply enough by the literature and is of 
particular relevance both to academics and to policy-makers. 
 
In particular, this paper presents a dynamic approach to the analysis of the evolution of the degree 
of Granger-causality between peripheral EMU sovereign yields behavior (Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Portugal and Spain). To this end, we have (1) tested for the existence of possible Granger-causal 
relationships between the evolution of these countries’ ten-year yields, (2) examined the time-
varying nature of these Granger-causal relationships to detect episodes of significant increase of 
causality between them, and (3) analyzed the determinants of these episodes. 
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Since it seems increasingly clear that the origin of sovereign debt crisis in Europe has gone beyond 
the imbalances in public finances and that there is an obvious interconnection between public and 
private debt, we have analyzed the role of the latter in the episodes of Granger-causality 
intensification by using a unique dataset on private debt-to-GDP by sector (households, banks and 
non-financial corporations) in each peripheral EMU country. Besides, since the reasons that may 
explain transmission of sovereign debt crisis from one country to another can be fundamental-
based or investor behavior-based, we have included instruments that capture both types. In 
addition, we have borne in mind that fundamental-based interconnection works not only through 
real linkages, but also through financial linkages across countries. Specifically, in the current 
scenario of increased cross-border financial activity in the euro area, special attention has been paid 
to the impact of the degree of integration of the banking system on the speed at which a sovereign 
crisis in a country can spill over to others. This channel of transmission has generally been ignored 
by the recent literature, but its relevance is crucial.  
 
The main findings of our analysis can be summarized as follows. Firstly, the results of the rolling 
analysis we apply in order to explore the dynamic causality between peripheral EMU yields suggest 
that there exist sub-periods of Granger-causality in all pair-wise relationships. Secondly, our 
empirical evidence suggests that the episodes with significant Granger-causality increase are 
concentrated around the first year of the launch of the EMU in 1999, the introduction of euro 
coins and banknotes in 2002 and, specially, the global financial crisis in the late-2000s. Therefore, 
our results indicate that the Granger-causality relationships between peripheral EMU yields have 
been significantly reinforced during the recent crises in sovereign debt markets since 2009. Thirdly, 
the results of the Probit models estimated to analyze the determinants of the previously detected 
episodes indicate that in all cases the variable that captures cross-border banking linkages is 
statistically significant. This finding suggests that, in a scenario of increased international financial 
activity in the euro area, transmission of the crisis in one country to other countries through the 
banking system may be a central issue (this is explained by the “financial trilemma” laid out by 
Schoenmaker, 2011). It is worth noting that macroeconomic imbalances in a specific country (the 
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instruments we have used to capture them also indicate that they are key determinants of the 
probability of occurrence of an episode of Granger-causality’s increase) lead to rising sovereign 
spreads and a devaluation of the government debt that is mirrored in banks’ balance sheets. 
Moreover, regarding the role of private debt, we find evidence of its high relevance in the cases of 
Ireland and Spain. In these two countries, in contrast to Greece and Portugal (were the origin of 
the debt crisis was the structural public deficit), the private sector’s indebtedness has been pointed 
out as the main cause of the debt crisis.  
 
Therefore, as mentioned, our results suggest that euro area crisis faces multiple overlapping and 
mutually reinforcing elements of fiscal (Greece and Portugal), banking (Ireland and Spain), and 
competitiveness (Southern periphery) crises. This situation has lead many authors (see, for example, 
Bergsten and Kirkegaard, 2012) to state that the euro area is foremost facing a crisis of 
“institutional design”. Indeed, the euro crisis began more than three years ago and there is still no 
end in sight. The main reason for this situation is that some of its root causes have been left largely 
unattended. In particular, no mechanism has been put in place to address the feedback loop 
between sovereigns and banks shown by our results. In this context, Pisani-Ferry (2012) lays out 
that the euro was imagined in the late 1980s in response to what was known as Mundell’s trilemma, 
according to which no country can enjoy at the same time free capital flows, stable exchange rates 
and independent monetary policies. According to this author, twenty years later, the euro area faces 
another trilemma that stems from three of the basic principles upon which the European currency 
is based: the absence of co-responsibility over public debt, the strict no-monetary financing rule and 
the national character of banking systems. The coexistence of these three principles makes the euro 
area fragile. Therefore now, as twenty years ago, the question is which of the constraints the euro 
area should give in. The problem is that putting in place the necessary mechanism to solve the 
trilemma would involve transforming the euro area into a full-fledged monetary union with a fiscal 
and banking union. Although nothing short of a political union might ultimately be sufficient to 
ensure the long term viability of the monetary union, it is equally clear that it will take significant 
time to achieve even under the most optimistic assumptions. 
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At this juncture, however, what appears more feasible and some of the short run policy 
implications that we suggest in this paper to fight this crisis are the following. The euro area would 
need  (a) to take a decisive step forward by creating a banking union (see, for example, Pisani-Ferry 
et al., 2012, or Schoenmaker and Gros, 2012) and/or (b) to issue jointly guaranteed Eurobonds (see 
Favero and Missale, 2011, Delpla and von Weizsacker, 2010, 2011, or Claessens et al., 2012, among 
others). 
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Appendix 1: Definition of the Explanatory Variables in the Probit models and Data 
Sources 
 
NAME VARIABLE SOURCE 
CACXX  Current-account-balance-to-GDP of country XX 
 
OECD (monthly data are linearly interpolated from 
quarterly observations) 
UXX  
 
Unemployment rate of country XX Eurostat (monthly data) 
INFXX  Inflation rate of country XX 
 
Eurostat (HICP monthly interannual rate of 
growth) 
RATXX  
 
Credit rating scale of country XX. Bloomberg: Standard &Poor’s, Moody’s and Fitch 
ratings for each government’s debt. 
DEFXX  Government deficit-to-GDP of country XX. 
 
Eurostat (monthly data are linearly interpolated 
from quarterly observations) 
XXLIQ Domestic Debt Securities. Public Sector 
Amounts Outstanding (billions of US dollars) of 
country XX. 
BIS Debt securities statistics. Table 18: Total debt 
securities by residence of issuer -General 
Government issues- (monthly data are linearly 
interpolated from quarterly observations) 
XXGOVDEB  
 
Government debt-to-GDP of country XX. Eurostat (monthly data are linearly interpolated 
from quarterly observations) 
XXBANDEB  
 
Banks’ debt-to-GDP of country XX ECB’s Monetary Financial Institutions balance 
sheets and own estimates (monthly data). GDP has 
been obtained from Eurostat (monthly data are 
linearly interpolated from quarterly observations) 
XXNFIDEB  Non-financial corporations’ debt-to-GDP of 
country XX 
 
ECB’s Monetary Financial Institutions balance 
sheets and own estimates (monthly data). GDP has 
been obtained from Eurostat (monthly data are 
linearly interpolated from quarterly observations) 
XXHOUDEB  
 
Households’ debt-to-GDP of country XX ECB’s Monetary Financial Institutions balance 
sheets and own estimates (monthly data). GDP has 
been obtained from Eurostat (monthly data are 
linearly interpolated from quarterly observations) 
XXBAN  Foreign bank claims on banks debt-to-GDP of 
country XX 
 
BIS Consolidated banking statistics. Table 9C: 
Foreign claims by sector and type, ultimate risk 
basis. GDP has been obtained from the OECD 
(monthly data are linearly interpolated from 
quarterly observations) 
XXPUB  Foreign bank claims on government debt-to-
GDP of country XX 
 
BIS Consolidated banking statistics. Table 9C: 
Foreign claims by sector and type, ultimate risk 
basis. GDP has been obtained from the OECD 
(monthly data are linearly interpolated from 
quarterly observations) 
XXPRI  Foreign bank claims on non-financial private 
debt-to-GDP of country XX 
 
BIS Consolidated banking statistics. Table 9C: 
Foreign claims by sector and type, ultimate risk 
basis. GDP has been obtained from the OECD 
(monthly data are linearly interpolated from 
quarterly observations) 
XXYYBAN  Percentage of the total foreign claims on country 
XX held by country YY's banks  
BIS Consolidated banking statistics. Table 9D: 
Foreign claims by nationality of reporting banks, 
ultimate risk basis and own estimates. 
RISK Chicago Board Options Exchange Market 
Volatility Index (VIX) 
Chicago Board Options Exchange 
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Figure 1a. Daily 10-year sovereign yields in peripheral EMU countries: 1999-2010 
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Figure 1b. Daily 10-year sovereign yield spreads over Germany: 1999-2010 
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Figure 2a: FPE sequence from rolling regressions running from Greece 
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Figure 2b: FPE sequence from rolling regressions running from Ireland 
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Figure 2c: FPE sequence from rolling regressions running from Italy 
ITALY -> GREECE
-0.0001
0
0.0001
0.0002
0.0003
0.0004
0.0005
0
1
/0
1
/2
0
0
1
0
1
/0
1
/2
0
0
2
0
1
/0
1
/2
0
0
3
0
1
/0
1
/2
0
0
4
0
1
/0
1
/2
0
0
5
0
1
/0
1
/2
0
0
6
0
1
/0
1
/2
0
0
7
0
1
/0
1
/2
0
0
8
0
1
/0
1
/2
0
0
9
0
1
/0
1
/2
0
1
0
 
ITALY -> IRELAND
-0.0002
0
0.0002
0.0004
0.0006
0.0008
0.001
0.0012
0.0014
0.0016
0.0018
0
1
/0
1
/1
9
9
9
0
1
/0
1
/2
0
0
0
0
1
/0
1
/2
0
0
1
0
1
/0
1
/2
0
0
2
0
1
/0
1
/2
0
0
3
0
1
/0
1
/2
0
0
4
0
1
/0
1
/2
0
0
5
0
1
/0
1
/2
0
0
6
0
1
/0
1
/2
0
0
7
0
1
/0
1
/2
0
0
8
0
1
/0
1
/2
0
0
9
0
1
/0
1
/2
0
1
0
 
ITALY - > PORTUGAL
-0.0003
-0.0002
-0.0001
0
0.0001
0.0002
0.0003
0.0004
0.0005
0.0006
0.0007
0
1
/0
1
/1
9
9
9
0
1
/0
1
/2
0
0
0
0
1
/0
1
/2
0
0
1
0
1
/0
1
/2
0
0
2
0
1
/0
1
/2
0
0
3
0
1
/0
1
/2
0
0
4
0
1
/0
1
/2
0
0
5
0
1
/0
1
/2
0
0
6
0
1
/0
1
/2
0
0
7
0
1
/0
1
/2
0
0
8
0
1
/0
1
/2
0
0
9
0
1
/0
1
/2
0
1
0
 
ITALY-> SPAIN
-0.00005
0
0.00005
0.0001
0.00015
0.0002
0
1
/0
1
/1
9
9
9
0
1
/0
1
/2
0
0
0
0
1
/0
1
/2
0
0
1
0
1
/0
1
/2
0
0
2
0
1
/0
1
/2
0
0
3
0
1
/0
1
/2
0
0
4
0
1
/0
1
/2
0
0
5
0
1
/0
1
/2
0
0
6
0
1
/0
1
/2
0
0
7
0
1
/0
1
/2
0
0
8
0
1
/0
1
/2
0
0
9
0
1
/0
1
/2
0
1
0
 
  
39 
Figure 2d: FPE sequence from rolling regressions running from Portugal 
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Figure 2e: FPE sequence from rolling regressions running from Spain 
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Figure 3a: Probit results, causal relationships running from Greece 
GREECE-> IRELAND
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Figure 3b: Probit results, causal relationships running from Ireland 
IRELAND -> GREECE
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Figure 3c: Probit results, causal relationships running from Italy 
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Figure 3d: Probit results, causal relationships running from Portugal 
PORTUGAL -> GREECE
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Figure 3e: Probit results, causal relationships running from Spain 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
Panel A: Levels     
  GR IE IT PT SP 
 Mean 4.995 4.543 4.491 4.541 4.379 
 Median 4.544 4.459 4.374 4.405 4.232 
 Maximum 12.440 9.012 5.879 7.104 5.870 
 Minimum 3.206 3.038 3.215 2.997 3.025 
 Std. Dev. 1.637 0.828 0.615 0.722 0.650 
 Skewness 2.714 1.236 0.343 0.423 0.376 
 Kurtosis 10.589 7.304 2.268 2.793 2.230 
 Jarque-Bera 9468.5 3213.9 131.5 99.0 151.2 
 Observations 2610 3131 3131 3131 3131 
Panel B: First differences       
  DGR DIE DIT DPT DSP 
 Mean 0.003 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.000 
 Median 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 Maximum 1.304 0.682 0.213 0.546 0.253 
 Minimum -4.323 -1.028 -0.319 -1.470 -0.441 
 Std. Dev. 0.117 0.058 0.041 0.062 0.044 
 Skewness -17.879 -1.162 0.181 -4.230 -0.077 
 Kurtosis 720.496 48.784 5.562 113.490 7.960 
 Jarque-Bera 56102048.0 274076.8 873.0 1601451.0 3211.0 
 Observations 2609 3130 3130 3130 3130 
 
Note: GR, IE, IT, PT and SP stand for Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain respectively. 
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Table 2. Augmented Dickey- Fuller tests for unit roots. 
Panel A: I (2) versus I (1) (Variables in first differences) 
 ττ τµ τ 
GR -17.8072* -17.6380* -17.5929* 
IE -47.7382* -47.7020* -47.6802* 
IT -52.3394* -52.3468* -52.3535* 
PT -31.6051* -31.5955* -31.5838* 
SP -51.8722* -51.8773* -51.8802* 
Panel B: I (1) versus I (0) (Variables in levels) 
 ττ τµ τ 
GR 0.2766 1.2043 1.5440 
IE 0.3425 0.3400 1.3145 
IT -2.6923 -2.0867 0.0225 
PT -1.0206 -1.2202 0.6855 
SP -1.8358 -1.7678 0.2859 
Notes:  
The ADF statistic is a test for the null hypothesis of a unit root. 
ττ, τμ and τ denote the ADF statistics with drift and trend, with drift, and without drift, respectively.  
* denotes significance at the 1% level. Critical values based on MacKinnon (1996) 
GR, IE, IT, PT and SP stand for Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain respectively. 
 
 
Table 3. KPSS tests for stationarity 
Panel A: I (2) versus I (1) (Variables in first differences) 
  ττ τµ 
GR  0.1052 0.2574 
IE  0.0877 0.3287 
IT  0.1083 0.1072 
PT  0.1103 0.1868 
SP  0.0975 0.1551 
Panel B: I (1) versus I (0) (Variables in levels) 
  ττ τµ 
GR  0.9832* 1.8948* 
IE  1.1606* 1.1528* 
IT  0.6825* 2.9237* 
PT  0.9373* 1.6140* 
SP  0.8374* 3.0079* 
Notes:  
The KPSS statistic is a test for the null hypothesis of stationarity. 
ττ and τμ denote the KPSS statistics with drift and trend, and with drift, respectively.  
* denotes significance at the 1% level. Asymptotic critical values based on Kwiatkowski et al. (1992. Table 1) 
GR, IE, IT, PT and SP stand for Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain respectively. 
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Table 4. Cointegration tests 
 Hypothesized numbers of  
cointegrating relations 
Trace statistic
a
 
 
p-value
b
 
GR. IE None 
At most one 
 
20.3839** 
1.0135 
0.0481 
0.9498 
GR. IT None 
At most one 
 
16.5832 
3.0084 
0.1488 
0.5791 
GR. PT None 
At most one 
 
21.0916** 
2.8721 
0.0384 
0.6049 
GR. SP None 
At most one 
 
14.7411 
2.6170 
0.2416 
0.6544 
IE. IT None 
At most one 
 
12.6781 
1.2744 
0.3901 
0.9118 
IE. PT None 
At most one 
 
10.2764 
1.7622 
0.6127 
0.8244 
IE. SP None 
At most one 
 
9.67O6 
1.0393 
0.6721 
0.9464 
IT. PT None 
At most one 
 
9.2582 
1.8854 
0.7119 
0.8004 
IT. SP None 
At most one 
 
13.5751 
2.7382 
0.3197 
0.6307 
PT. SP None 
At most one 
 
15.5181 
2.9255 
0.1981 
0.5947 
 
Notes:   
* and ** denote rejection of the hypothesis at the 1% and 5% level, respectively.   
MacKinnon et al. (1999)’s p-values.  
GR, IE, IT, PT and SP stand for Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain, respectively. 
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Table 5. FPE statistics for the whole sample 
 
 FPE(m.0)x10
-3
 FPE(m.n) x10
-3
 Causality 
GR →  IE 3.4311 (1.0) 3.3972 (1.1) Yes 
  IE   → GR 13.1864 (4.0) 12.8586 (4.4) Yes 
GR →  IT 1.6707 (1.0) 1.6695 (1.1) Yes 
 IT  →  GR 13.1864 (4.0) 13.0770 (4.1) Yes 
 GR →  PT 3.5423 (4.0) 3.5096 (4.1) Yes 
 PT →  GR 13.1864 (4.0) 12.6075 (4.4) Yes 
GR → SP 1.9055 (4.0) 1.9063 (4.1) No 
 SP  → GR 13.1864 (4.0) 13.1102 (4.4) Yes 
IE  →  IT 1.6910 (1.0) 1.6586 (1.1) Yes 
IT  →  IE 3.2584 (1.0) 3.2596 (1.1) No 
IE  →  PT 3.8007 (4.0) 3.6855 (4.1) Yes 
PT →  IE 3.2584 (1.0) 3.2602 (1.1) No 
IE  →  SP 1.9248 (4.0) 1.8941 (4.1) Yes 
SP →  IE 3.2584 (1.0) 1.9248 (1.4) Yes 
IT  → PT 3.8007 (4.0) 3.7989 (4.1) Yes 
PT → IT 1.6910 (1.0) 1.6812 (1.1) Yes 
IT  → SP 1.9248 (4.0) 1.9214 (4.1) Yes 
SP  → IT 1.6910 (1.0) 1.6878 (1.1) Yes 
PT  → SP 1.9248 (4.0) 1.9183 (4.1) Yes 
SP  → PT 3.8007 (4.0) 3.7832 (4.11) Yes 
Notes:  
The figures in brackets are the optimum order of lags in each pair of countries 
GR, IE, IT, PT and SP stand for Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain, respectively. 
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Table 6. Domestic Debt Securities; Public Sector Amounts Outstanding (billions US 
dollars) 
 
  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
2010 
% over 
EMU 
Finland 67.60 58.69 54.06 62.59 72.57 81.03 67.92 75.42 80.90 74.30 91.38 100.26 1.2% 
Ireland 23.74 20.27 17.30 23.41 35.53 42.58 36.94 41.08 45.56 58.26 121.04 129.70 1.5% 
Portugal 49.71 47.59 49.81 64.70 82.85 97.68 99.64 118.45 136.16 142.26 169.67 186.44 2.2% 
Austria 108.92 108.75 108.35 133.47 165.09 181.25 163.83 191.07 219.48 219.85 242.72 239.75 2.8% 
Greece 90.17 91.77 96.11 129.32 175.06 216.32 206.58 244.31 298.61 339.63 407.85 382.65 4.5% 
Netherlands 182.96 165.30 159.49 198.35 257.05 293.31 260.16 278.85 307.63 394.85 389.44 392.97 4.6% 
Belgium 251.03 235.42 229.07 276.36 328.65 351.19 308.97 343.23 398.58 408.31 442.34 437.86 5.1% 
Spain 304.83 294.58 283.19 346.62 418.28 461.64 408.49 451.58 497.56 542.91 746.11 795.72 9.3% 
France 624.01 606.14 609.95 787.66 1055.80 1235.76 1141.28 1276.15 1487.32 1540.61 1821.81 1819.94 21.2% 
Germany 754.03 726.08 705.14 911.60 1183.52 1379.75 1272.63 1493.82 1716.99 1662.60 1870.40 2039.98 23.7% 
Italy 1102.49 1040.50 1015.76 1209.14 1471.05 1637.30 1468.59 1689.94 1928.08 1920.20 2114.23 2069.18 24.1% 
              
EMU 3559.48 3395.09 3328.23 4143.23 5245.44 5977.80 5435.04 6203.89 7116.87 7303.77 8416.99 8594.42 100.0% 
Source: This table has been constructed from data collected from Table 18 of BIS Debt securities statistics.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
51 
Table 7. Debt-to-GDP by sector. 
 
 
 
Note: Debt-to-GDP at the end of each year.   
Source: Eurostat, Monetary Financial Institutions (MFIs) balance sheets obtained from the European Central Bank and 
authors’ estimates. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
GREECE 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Average 2002-06 
(I) 
Average 2007-10 
(II) 
% 
(II)/(I) 
Banks  24.6 26.0 25.5 28.4 33.7 48.4 63.2 68.5 97.6 27.6 69.4 151% 
Households  19.5 22.6 27.0 32.6 37.0 40.4 40.8 41.5 59.9 35.7 45.6 28% 
Non-financial corporations  32.6 33.2 34.0 37.5 39.0 43.1 50.9 48.0 53.0 41.3 48.8 18% 
General Government  101.7 97.4 98.9 109.0 106.4 105.4 110.7 127.1 142.8 111.0 121.5 9% 
IRELAND 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Average 2002-06 
(I) 
Average 2007-10 
(II) 
% 
(II)/(I) 
Banks  287.1 329.0 399.3 491.9 579.6 609.7 726.1 753.6 729.1 417.4 704.6 69% 
Households  43.9 48.5 60.9 70.9 77.8 81.2 84.8 92.3 89.5 72.2 86.9 20% 
Non-financial corporations  40.2 44.0 55.4 63.6 79.9 91.3 105.9 107.2 72.0 73.3 94.1 28% 
General Government  30.7 31.0 29.5 27.4 24.8 25.0 44.4 65.6 96.2 41.6 57.8 39% 
ITALY 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Average 2002-06 
(I) 
Average 2007-10 
(II) 
% 
(II)/(I) 
Banks  65.5 69.4 71.9 77.1 85.6 94.1 104.1 105.9 104.3 73.9 102.1 38% 
Households  21.5 23.0 25.1 27.0 28.5 29.8 30.3 32.7 38.1 28.4 32.7 15% 
Non-financial corporations  44.4 46.4 47.4 48.0 51.7 56.8 60.9 61.7 62.3 53.3 60.4 13% 
General Government  105.7 104.4 103.9 105.9 106.6 103.6 106.3 116.1 119.0 107.9 111.3 3% 
PORTUGAL 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Average 2002-06 
(I) 
Average 2007-10 
(II) 
% 
(II)/(I) 
Banks  106.3 113.3 101.6 103.8 115.3 126.4 136.6 156.3 182.5 108.1 150.4 39% 
Households  59.3 58.6 60.4 64.5 70.7 74.5 78.3 81.7 82.3 70.0 79.2 13% 
Non-financial corporations  68.2 67.9 67.2 70.8 72.7 78.7 90.8 93.0 90.6 77.8 88.3 14% 
General Government  53.8 55.9 57.6 62.8 69.5 68.3 71.6 83.0 93.0 68.4 79.0 15% 
SPAIN 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Average 2002-06 
(I) 
Average 2007-10 
(II) 
% 
(II)/(I) 
Banks  72.4 78.5 84.7 107.3 116.9 133.7 150.1 161.4 159.2 92.0 151.1 64% 
Households  47.5 51.1 55.8 66.4 74.2 78.3 81.9 83.5 82.1 69.0 81.4 18% 
Non-financial corporations  47.1 49.6 53.8 63.0 76.3 85.5 91.2 90.4 87.0 71.6 88.5 24% 
General Government  52.5 48.7 46.2 43.0 39.6 36.1 39.8 53.3 60.1 46.6 47.3 2% 
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Table 8. Foreign banks’ claims on individual countries-to-GDP by sector. 
Foreign banks’ claims on public sector debt/GDP         
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Average 
GREECE 30.79 33.64 36.07 30.56 29.93 17.64 29.77 
IRELAND 4.78 6.19 7.56 8.37 15.19 11.69 8.96 
ITALY 20.59 21.55 23.24 21.45 24.05 13.07 20.66 
PORTUGAL 19.47 22.03 20.61 20.60 24.00 12.68 19.90 
SPAIN 8.46 8.86 8.16 7.50 9.21 6.73 8.15 
Foreign banks’ claims on banks debt/GDP         
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Average 
GREECE 6.23 7.02 10.04 12.17 10.33 3.55 8.23 
IRELAND 103.93 120.21 140.62 100.51 92.71 51.09 101.51 
ITALY 10.85 12.87 14.97 11.03 9.46 7.38 11.09 
PORTUGAL 15.77 19.14 23.58 19.71 21.08 15.88 19.19 
SPAIN 16.72 20.78 26.61 23.51 23.03 14.91 20.93 
Foreign banks’ claims on non-financial private sector debt/GDP     
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Average 
GREECE 16.73 27.42 35.73 36.01 26.07 26.22 28.03 
IRELAND 133.91 177.50 251.16 269.12 252.07 213.98 216.29 
ITALY 11.60 20.67 28.28 23.07 24.97 22.83 21.90 
PORTUGAL 32.12 38.35 46.84 46.22 49.83 45.57 43.15 
SPAIN 17.38 25.38 33.61 29.83 30.52 25.09 26.97 
 
Note: Reliance on foreign bank financing is measured by the consolidated claims on an immediate borrower basis of 
Bank for International Settlements (BIS) reporting banks on each sector (public, banks and non-financial corporations as 
a proportion of GDP). Data correspond to the end of each year.  
Source: This table has been constructed from data collected from Table 9C of BIS Consolidated banking statistics and the 
OECD. 
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Table 9.  Claims by nationality of reporting banks as a proportion of total foreign claims. 
GREECE 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Average 
Austrian banks 3.3 2.8 2.4 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.5 
Belgian banks 8.7 5.6 5.7 3.8 2.0 1.3 4.5 
Finnish banks 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
French banks 9.4 19.1 24.4 28.4 36.7 39.6 26.2 
German banks 22.0 18.1 15.9 14.5 20.9 23.7 19.2 
Irish banks 0.0 5.6 3.6 3.2 4.0 0.6 2.8 
Italian banks 2.2 0.0 4.3 3.6 3.2 2.9 2.7 
Dutch banks 11.3 8.8 7.9 4.9 5.7 3.5 7.0 
Portuguese banks 1.9 2.3 2.5 2.4 4.6 7.2 3.5 
Spanish banks 0.6 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.7 0.5 
British banks 5.4 4.6 5.5 4.8 7.1 9.8 6.2 
US banks 5.0 4.1 3.4 2.6 7.7 5.1 4.6 
Others 30.3 28.7 24.0 29.3 5.4 3.3 20.2 
IRELAND 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Average 
Austrian banks 1.22 1.39 1.16 0.76 1.27 0.64 1.1 
Belgian banks 8.82 10.52 8.42 6.75 5.68 5.62 7.6 
Finnish banks 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.16 0.0 
French banks 7.30 9.06 12.02 10.10 8.47 6.55 8.9 
German banks 25.78 23.95 25.90 29.97 29.88 26.13 26.9 
Greek banks 0.22 0.12 0.07 0.05 0.10 0.11 0.1 
Italian banks 3.71 2.96 3.43 3.62 2.83 2.99 3.3 
Dutch banks 9.92 7.49 5.69 5.25 4.58 3.70 6.1 
Portuguese banks 0.52 0.75 0.40 0.56 0.76 1.14 0.7 
Spanish banks 3.11 3.81 3.04 2.20 2.38 2.22 2.8 
British banks 26.49 26.91 26.21 28.22 27.12 29.91 27.5 
US banks 3.15 3.97 4.51 4.89 9.28 11.27 6.2 
Others 9.77 9.07 9.15 7.63 7.67 9.57 8.8 
PORTUGAL 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Average 
Austrian banks 1.39 1.31 1.09 1.11 1.15 0.81 1.1 
Belgian banks 5.14 6.65 4.77 5.28 2.33 1.75 4.3 
Finnish banks 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.19 0.0 
French banks 10.28 10.55 13.79 13.11 17.83 13.33 13.1 
German banks 20.64 19.27 20.05 19.50 18.79 18.03 19.4 
Greek banks 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.04 0.0 
Irish banks 0.00 4.30 3.62 2.78 2.16 1.35 2.4 
Italian banks 3.18 3.83 3.39 2.72 2.66 2.01 3.0 
Dutch banks 7.45 6.66 7.39 6.07 5.61 3.24 6.1 
Spanish banks 35.12 31.99 32.23 33.93 33.71 41.89 34.8 
British banks 11.17 8.68 8.55 9.62 10.20 12.05 10.0 
US banks 1.64 2.26 1.51 0.81 1.85 2.61 1.8 
Others 3.98 4.50 3.60 5.05 3.66 2.70 3.9 
SPAIN 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Average 
Austrian banks 0.86 0.87 0.82 0.87 0.96 0.95 0.9 
Belgian banks 4.22 4.52 4.44 4.82 2.46 3.06 3.9 
Finnish banks 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.22 0.0 
French banks 18.25 14.94 18.92 19.35 22.97 20.01 19.1 
German banks 26.51 30.07 29.23 27.83 25.89 25.88 27.6 
Greek banks 0.06 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.0 
Irish banks 0.00 3.86 3.84 3.70 3.45 2.13 2.8 
Italian banks 2.49 2.34 2.70 3.12 3.39 4.22 3.0 
Dutch banks 16.87 13.95 13.36 13.69 13.02 10.94 13.6 
Portugal banks 2.61 2.84 2.77 3.14 3.14 3.80 3.0 
British banks 15.23 13.84 12.55 13.66 11.98 15.25 13.8 
US banks 4.55 4.72 4.12 3.67 6.31 6.72 5.0 
Others 8.35 8.02 7.25 6.12 6.37 6.78 7.1 
ITALY 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Average 
Austrian banks 2.64 2.19 2.04 1.61 2.23 2.58 2.2 
Belgian banks 10.85 8.09 4.38 4.74 2.83 2.99 5.6 
Finnish banks 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.0 
French banks 18.94 27.45 37.66 42.79 44.44 45.53 36.1 
German banks 25.26 20.10 19.41 18.91 16.60 18.82 19.9 
Greek banks 0.15 0.07 0.02 0.03 0.06 0.07 0.1 
Irish banks 0.00 5.20 3.94 4.25 3.99 1.53 3.2 
Dutch banks 10.84 13.82 11.65 6.11 6.04 5.26 9.0 
Portuguese banks 0.76 0.75 0.41 0.32 0.47 0.35 0.5 
Spanish banks 4.44 2.99 2.82 4.44 4.13 3.62 3.7 
British banks 9.22 7.02 7.09 6.83 6.71 7.70 7.4 
US banks 5.78 3.25 2.79 2.33 4.66 4.26 3.8 
Others 11.12 9.08 7.78 7.65 7.84 7.21 8.4 
Note: This table displays the consolidated claims on an immediate borrower basis of Bank for International Settlements 
(BIS) by nationality of reporting banks as a proportion of total foreign claims on each country. Data correspond to the 
end of each year.  
Source: This table has been constructed from data collected from Table 9D of BIS Consolidated banking statistics 
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Table 10a:  Probit models, causal relationships running from Greece 
    GREECE→ IRELAND GREECE → ITALY GREECE → PORTUGAL GREECE → SPAIN 
Constant 
- 
 
Constant 
3.6366 
(2.9731) 
Constant 
8.2950 
(2.7206) 
Constant 
3.8909 
(2.6997) 
GRIEBAN 
3.0647 
(2.9132) 
[0.4567] 
GRITBAN 
7.2099 
(2.8625) 
[0.5504] 
GRPTBAN 
16.6843 
(2.9053) 
[0.7940] 
GRSPBAN 
13.2210 
(2.8541) 
[0.5983] 
DEFIE 
0.1700 
(2.6513) 
[0.0253] 
- - - - 
DEFSP 
0.3204 
(2.9172) 
[0.0145] 
GRGOVDEB 
0.1262 
(2.8591) 
[0.0188] 
GRGOVDEB 
7.7571 
(2.7749) 
[0.5922] 
GRGOVDEB 
2.9152 
(2.8010) 
[0.1387] 
GRGOVDEB 
1.9722 
(2.8539) 
[0.0893] 
GRBANDEB 
0.2986 
(2.8522) 
[0.0445] 
- - - - - - 
- - - - 
GRNFIDEB 
2.2784 
(2.7981) 
[0.1084] 
- - 
- - - - 
GRPUB 
2.4814 
(3.9466) 
[0.1181] 
- - 
- - - - 
GRPRI 
9.9372 
(2.8645) 
[0.4729] 
- - 
IEBAN 
0.0930 
(2.8260) 
[0.0139] 
- - - - - - 
IEPRI 
0.0571 
(2.8762) 
[0.0085] 
- - - - - - 
- - 
INFGR 
4.3869 
(2.8793) 
[0.3349] 
INFGR 
3.4490 
(2.8622) 
[0.1641] 
- - 
UGR 
1.7894 
(2.9685) 
[0.2675] 
UGR 
7.2370 
(2.8365) 
[0.5525] 
UGR 
13.6705 
(2.8451) 
[0.6506] 
UGR 
9.8748 
(2.8737) 
[0.4469] 
- - 
RATGR 
0.8469 
(2.8778) 
[0.0646] 
- - - - 
- - - - 
RATPT 
2.7325 
(2.7830) 
[0.1301] 
- - 
GRLIQ 
0.0498 
(2.9134) 
[0.0074] 
GRLIQ 
0.3215 
(2.8754) 
[0.0245] 
GRLIQ 
0.2481 
(2.9163) 
[0.0116] 
GRLIQ 
0.2108 
(2.8415) 
[0.0095] 
IELIQ 
0.0594 
(2.8647) 
[0.0088] 
ITLIQ 
-0.3774 
(-2.8339) 
[-0.0288] 
PTLIQ 
0.4957 
(2.9542) 
[0.0236] 
SPLIQ 
0.3296 
(2.8325) 
[0.0149] 
RISK 
0.1858 
(2.8558) 
[0.0277] 
RISK 
4.9026 
(2.8539) 
[0.3743] 
RISK 
7.1002 
(2.9081) 
[0.3379] 
RISK 
7.3125 
(2.8743) 
[0.3309] 
McFadden R-squared 0.6994 McFadden R-squared 0.9054 McFadden R-squared 0.9104 McFadden R-squared 0.9115 
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Table 10b:  Probit models, causal relationships running from Ireland 
 
 
 
 
    IRELAND→ GREECE IRELAND → ITALY IRELAND → PORTUGAL IRELAND → SPAIN 
Constant 
-1.5458 
(-2.9036) 
Constant 
-2.1732 
(-2.7931) 
Constant 
-2.0214 
(-2.7722) 
Constant 
1.4966 
(2.7134) 
 
IEGRBAN 
6.2617 
(2.9434) 
[0.6320] 
IEITBAN 
0.8343 
(2.8121) 
[0.1063] 
IEPTBAN 
1.6204 
(2.8658) 
[0.1676] 
IESPBAN 
0.8592 
(2.9215) 
[0.0734] 
DEFIE 
4.0375 
(2.8661) 
[0.4070] 
DEFIE 
3.8117 
(2.8146) 
[0.4858] 
DEFIE 
0.4748 
(2.8015) 
[0.0491] 
DEFIE 
0.4998 
(2.8376) 
[0.0427] 
- - - - 
IEGOVDEB 
1.7880 
(2.8136) 
[0.1850] 
IEGOVDEB 
2.1163 
(2.8114) 
[0.1807] 
IEBANDEB 
5.7021 
(2.8213) 
[0.5755] 
IEBANDEB 
4.9086 
(2.9260) 
[0.6256] 
IEBANDEB 
5.7896 
(2.9712) 
[0.5989] 
IEBANDEB 
6.9868 
(2.8225) 
[0.5966] 
IEPUB 
1.4075 
(2.7982) 
[0.1421] 
IEPUB 
1.9070 
(2.7941) 
[0.2430] 
IEPUB 
1.2466 
(2.8239) 
[0.1289] 
IEPUB 
1.8200 
(2.9735) 
[0.1554] 
- - - - 
IEBAN 
0.0827 
(2.8380) 
[0.0086] 
IEBAN 
0.4220 
(2.8045) 
[0.0260] 
- - 
INFIE 
2.5504 
(2.8176) 
[0.3250] 
- - - - 
- - - - 
UIE 
6.1241 
(2.8143) 
[0.6335] 
- - 
- - - - 
UPT 
1.8149 
(2.8211) 
[0.1877] 
USP 
3.6142 
(2.8407) 
[0.3086] 
- - - - 
CACPT 
-4.2778 
(-2.9517) 
[-0.4425] 
- - 
IELIQ 
0.0211 
(2.8178) 
[0.0021] 
IELIQ 
0.2974 
(2.7973) 
[0.0507] 
IELIQ 
0.3781 
(2.7842) 
[0.0391] 
IELIQ 
0.1026 
(2.9114) 
[0.0088] 
GRLIQ 
0.0111 
(2.8055) 
[0.0011] 
ITLIQ 
-0.1301 
(-2.8366) 
[-0.0166] 
PTLIQ 
0.1926 
(2.8296) 
[0.0199] 
SPLIQ 
0.0408 
(2.8378) 
[0.0035] 
RISK 
1.8796 
(2.7988) 
[0.1897] 
RISK 
0.7951 
(2.8115) 
[0.1013] 
RISK 
1.8934 
(2.8411) 
[0.1959] 
RISK 
0.7844 
(2.8445) 
[0.0670] 
McFadden R-squared 0.7322 McFadden R-squared 0.8697 McFadden R-squared 0.8539 McFadden R-squared 0.7715 
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Table 10c:  Probit models, causal relationships running from Italy 
 
 
 
 
    ITALY→ GREECE ITALY→  IRELAND  ITALY → PORTUGAL ITALY → SPAIN 
Constant 
-147.7035 
(-2.7451) 
Constant 
21.6883 
(2.7548) 
Constant 
4.3911 
(2.9547) 
Constant 
-3.8579 
(-2.8161) 
ITGRBAN 
6.1091 
(2.8083) 
[0.3192] 
ITIEBAN 
5.0801 
(2.8373) 
[0.6232] 
ITPTBAN 
5.4385 
(2.8181) 
[0.4101] 
ITSPBAN 
3.6617 
(2.8645) 
[0.3174] 
DEFIT 
1.2928 
(2.8748) 
[0.0676] 
DEFIT 
1.5216 
(2.8125) 
[0.1867] 
DEFIT 
0.8830 
(2.9155) 
[0.0666] 
DEFIT 
5.2970 
(2.9183) 
[0.4591] 
- - 
ITGOVDEB 
0.8334 
(2.8356) 
[0.1022] 
ITGOVDEB 
2.7902 
(2.8157) 
[0.2104] 
ITGOVDEB 
2.6745 
(2.8114) 
[0.2318] 
ITBANDEB 
0.2461 
(2.9777) 
[0.0129] 
ITBANDEB 
2.6303 
(2.9111) 
[0.3227] 
- - 
ITBANDEB 
4.6368 
(2.7894) 
[0.4019] 
ITHOUDEB 
7.6864 
(2.7543) 
[0.4017] 
ITHOUDEB 
1.4070 
(2.8519) 
[0.1726] 
ITHOUDEB 
2.4669 
(2.8112) 
[0.1860] 
- - 
ITPUB 
4.1310 
(2.7449) 
[0.2159] 
- - - - - - 
UIT 
1.4512 
(2.8403) 
[0.0758] 
UIT 
2.3506 
(2.8992) 
[0.2884] 
UIT 
1.0125 
(2.9480) 
[0.0764] 
UIT 
8.9497 
(2.7971) 
[0.7757] 
- - - - 
UPT 
5.2870 
(2.7987) 
[0.3987] 
- - 
- - - - 
RATIT 
1.7912 
(2.8243) 
[0.2104] 
- - 
RATGR 
8.3668 
(2.9418) 
[0.4372] 
RATIE 
2.2207 
(2.7845) 
[0.2724] 
- - 
RATSP 
1.6326 
(2.8071) 
[0.1415] 
ITLIQ 
-0.0324 
(-2.7489) 
[-0.0017] 
ITLIQ 
-0.0084 
(-2.8410) 
[-0.0010] 
ITLIQ 
-0.0358 
(-2.8412) 
[-0.0027] 
ITLIQ 
-0.6509 
(-2.8102) 
[-0.0564]
 
GRLIQ 
0.1953 
(2.9683) 
[0.0102] 
IELIQ 
0.0772 
(2.8384) 
[0.0095] 
PTLIQ 
0.0499 
(2.7967) 
[0.0038] 
SPLIQ 
0.3262 
(2.8491) 
[0.0283] 
RISK 
0.1848 
(2.8257) 
[0.0097] 
RISK 
0.2846 
(2.7947) 
[0.0346] 
RISK 
1.1016 
(2.8102) 
[0.0831] 
RISK 
5.1443 
(2.7911) 
[0.4459] 
McFadden R-squared 0.7395 McFadden R-squared 0.8896 McFadden R-squared 0.8404 McFadden R-squared 0.8012 
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Table 10d:  Probit models, causal relationships running from Portugal 
PORTUGAL→ GREECE PORTUGAL→  IRELAND  PORTUGAL→ ITALY  PORTUGAL → SPAIN 
Constant 
-10.7104 
(-2.7990) 
Constant 
21.9866 
(2.7645) 
Constant 
-8.8861 
(-2.7831) 
Constant 
- 
PTGRBAN 
6.8649 
(2.9412) 
[0.5115] 
PTIEBAN 
5.8230 
(2.8312) 
[0.4820] 
PTITBAN 
5.8690 
(2.9051) 
[0.5057] 
PTSPBAN 
1.5364 
(2.8966) 
[0.6624] 
DEFPT 
0.5226 
(2.7988) 
[0.0389] 
DEFPT 
1.4552 
(2.8802) 
[0.1204] 
DEFPT 
1.3031 
(2.9124) 
[0.1123] 
DEFPT 
1.4371 
(2.8211) 
[0.6197] 
- - - - 
PTGOVDEB 
1.1837 
(2.7761) 
[0.1020] 
- - 
- - 
IEGOVDEB 
0.6317 
(2.8561) 
[0.0523] 
- - 
SPGOVDEB 
1.1157 
(2.7898) 
[0.4811] 
PTNFIDEB 
1.3836 
(2.8721) 
[0.1031] 
- - - - - - 
PTBANDEB 
1.0106 
(2.9308) 
[0.0753] 
- - - - - - 
PTPUB 
1.1303 
(2.8740) 
[0.0842] 
- - 
PTPUB 
5.6289 
(2.8256) 
[0.2466] 
- - 
INFPT 
3.2285 
(2.8519) 
[0.2405] 
INFPT 
1.8814 
(2.8650) 
[0.1557] 
- - 
INFPT 
0.5534 
(2.8221) 
[0.2386] 
UPT 
9.3581 
(2.8743) 
[0.6972] 
UPT 
1.1380 
(2.9154) 
[0.0942] 
UPT 
3.7056 
(2.9012) 
[0.3193] 
UPT 
1.2220 
(2.7879) 
[0.5269] 
- - 
UIE 
1.6690 
(2.9314) 
[0.1381] 
UIT 
2.8616 
(2.7897) 
[0.4850] 
USP 
1.2273 
(2.7956) 
[0.5292] 
- - 
RATPT 
2.0538 
(2.8343) 
[0.1699] 
RATPT 
1.5389 
(2.8612) 
[0.1326] 
RATPT 
0.3497 
(2.8712) 
[0.1508] 
- - - - 
RATIT 
2.2728 
(2.8067) 
[0.1958] 
- - 
PTLIQ 
0.1086 
(2.9518) 
[0.0089] 
PTLIQ 
0.0548 
(2.8164) 
[0.0045] 
PTLIQ 
0.1844 
(2.7740) 
[0.0159] 
PTLIQ 
0.1616 
(2.9014) 
[0.0697] 
GRLIQ 
0.0173 
(2.7986) 
[0.0013] 
IELIQ 
0.1667 
(2.9167) 
[0.0138] 
ITLIQ 
-0.3415 
(-2.9521) 
[-0.0294] 
SPLIQ 
0.2123 
(2.8612) 
[0.0916] 
RISK 
0.6213 
(2.8648) 
[0.0463] 
RISK 
1.0465 
(2.7799) 
[0.0866] 
RISK 
2.3108 
(2.8213) 
[0.1991] 
RISK 
1.1060 
(2.7863) 
[0.4769] 
McFadden R-squared 0.7705 McFadden R-squared 0.8861 McFadden R-squared 0.7325 McFadden R-squared 0.8948 
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Table 10e:  Probit models, causal relationships running from Spain 
SPAIN→ GREECE SPAIN→  IRELAND  SPAIN→ ITALY  SPAIN→  PORTUGAL  
Constant 
-26.1653 
(-2.7745) 
Constant 
8.2908 
(2.7894) 
Constant 
-2.1144 
(-2.7614) 
Constant 
-6.2569 
(-2.7625) 
SPGRBAN 
5.5165 
(2.9035) 
[0.2747] 
SPIEBAN 
2.5361 
(2.9103) 
[0.2686] 
SPITBAN 
1.9815 
(2.8453) 
[0.2029] 
SPPTBAN 
0.8084 
(2.7593) 
[0.2591] 
- - 
DEFSP 
3.5618 
(2.8191) 
[0.3782] 
DEFSP 
4.5066 
(2.7915) 
[0.4614] 
- - 
- - 
SPGOVDEB 
0.7896 
(2.8676) 
[0.0838] 
SPGOVDEB 
5.5866 
(2.8121) 
[0.5720] 
- - 
SPNFIDEB 
0.9817 
(2.8314) 
[0.0489] 
- - - - 
SPNFIDEB 
0.1315 
(2.8560) 
[0.0421] 
SPBANDEB 
2.7065 
(2.8451) 
[0.1348] 
SPBANDEB 
0.0938 
(2.7988) 
[0.0100] 
- - - - 
SPPUB 
8.4892 
(2.9176) 
[0.4228] 
- - - - - - 
- - 
SPBAN 
0.7165 
(2.8145) 
[0.0761] 
- - - - 
- - - - 
ITPUB 
5.2408 
(2.8512) 
[0.5366] 
- - 
- - 
USP 
6.8754 
(2.7824) 
[0.7300] 
USP 
7.1764 
(2.8161) 
[0.7347] 
- - 
- - 
UIE 
1.5295 
(2.9143) 
[0.1624] 
UIT 
4.9746 
(2.8013) 
[0.5093] 
UPT 
1.3479 
(2.9141) 
[0.4319] 
CACSP 
-2.1886 
(-2.8547) 
[-0.1090] 
CACSP 
-1.4087 
(-2.8104) 
[-0.1496] 
CACSP 
-2.6802 
(-2.7978) 
[-0.2744] 
- - 
RATSP 
4.8822 
(2.8287) 
[0.2432] 
- - - - - - 
RATGR 
1.5694 
(2.8295) 
[0.0782] 
- - 
RATIT 
3.7418 
(2.8315) 
[0.3831] 
- - 
SPLIQ 
0.0325 
(2.8734) 
[0.0016] 
SPLIQ 
0.0553 
(2.8654) 
[0.0059] 
SPLIQ 
0.3724 
(2.7986) 
[0.0381] 
SPLIQ 
0.2728 
(2.8112) 
[0.0874] 
GRLIQ 
0.0428 
(2.7841) 
[0.0021] 
IELIQ 
0.4745 
(2.8710) 
[0.0504] 
ITLIQ 
-0.6138 
(-2.9011) 
[-0.0628] 
PTLIQ 
0.1785 
(2.8283) 
[0.0572] 
RISK 
0.6930 
(2.7936) 
[0.0345] 
RISK 
2.0466 
(2.7814) 
[0.2173] 
RISK 
2.9255 
(2.8576) 
[0.2995] 
RISK 
1.0696 
(2.7911) 
[0.3428] 
McFadden R-squared 0.8329 McFadden R-squared 0.7922 McFadden R-squared 0.7517 McFadden R-squared 0.7402 
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Notes: In the ordinary brackets below the parameter estimates are the corresponding z-statistics. In the square brackets, the associated marginal effects are given. 
XXYYBAN = Percentage of the total foreign claims on country XX held by country YY’s banks.  
DEFXX = Government deficit-to-GDP of country XX.  
XXGOVDEB = Government debt-to-GDP of country XX.  
XXBANDEB = Banks’ debt-to-GDP of country XX.  
XXNFIDEB = Non-financial corporations’ debt-to-GDP of country XX.  
XXHOUDEB = Households’ debt-to-GDP of country XX.  
XXPUB = Foreign bank’s claims on government debt-to-GDP of country XX.  
XXBAN = Foreign bank’s claims on banks debt-to-GDP of country XX.  
XXPRI = Foreign bank’s claims on non-financial private debt-to-GDP of country XX.  
INFXX = Inflation rate of country XX.  
UXX = Unemployment rate of country XX.  
CACXX = Current-account-balance-to-GDP of country XX.  
RATXX = Credit rating scale of country XX.  
XXLIQ = Overall outstanding amount of government domestic debt securities of country XX.  
RISK = Global risk aversion indicator.   
GR, IE, IT, PT and SP stand for Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain, respectively. 
